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IX THFJ 
SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
I<:EXXI~~TH \\ ... HITE, 
..:ippellaut. 
YS. 
l<:r~NXETH J. PIXXEY, doing busi-
ness a~ the PIXXEY BE\:""ERAGE 
CO:JIP _,__~XI'", and _._-\_. C. NESLEN, 
Respondents. 
No. 6218 
_._\ ppeal fron1 the Third Judicial District Court, 
lionorahle ~[. J. Bronson, Judge. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. 
ST1\TE~fENT OF TETE CASE 
rrhis is an appeal froin a judgment made and entered 
in the ~~hird Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
Count~', on .April 21, 1939, in favor of Appellee and 
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against Appellant, and from an order made and entered 
by the said Court on June 30, 1939, denying appellant's 
motion for a new trial. (Transcript 79 and 84, Abstract 
58, 61, 62). 
Appellant brought this action against the defendants 
to recover for personal injuries. On December 23, 1938 
at about 4:30p.m., appellant's Chevrolet panel truck was 
parked on the west side of Highland Drive, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, at a point opposite 2333 South. The truck 
was facing south and was parallel to and 'vithin six or 
eight inches of the west curb. Appellant was standing 
behind and a little to the west of the center of the truck 
!1nd vvas in the act of handing some flovvers to a customer, 
the witness l\f axwell, who was standing slightly to the 
north and east of appellant, when a wheel with consider-
able force struck appellant on the left leg injuring him. 
(Transcript 95-99 and 141-144, Abstract 18, 19). The 
\vitnes~, ~fax\vell, testified that the \vheel buzzed past hi~ 
and he sa\v it strike appellant on the leg and bounce, con1-
ing to rest on the curb. (Transeript 14-1-144, Abstract 18, 
19.) Just as he was hit, appellant saw a fast-moving, 
staked-hod:T truck 'vith barrels on the back going north~ 
having passed the point on the ~treet 'vhere appellant 
\\Tas hit. Appellant picked up the \vheel and overtook the 
truck \vhich \vas parked ~n front of an inn at about 2160 
South Highland Drive. Appellant noticed a hand-truck 
or dolly \vith a 1nissing 'vheel hanging on thP side of the 
truek. On this hand-truck \\Tas a \vheel si1nilar to the 
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"7'heel \vhich had ~truck appellant. Appellant gave the 
\\~heel to thP driYPr of the truck, the defendant N eslen, 
infor1ning hin1 that the \Yheel had struck appellant. (Trans-
cript 100-10-L _._-\bstraet 1:1~ 16). The defendant N eslen 
'Ya~ driYing the truck for the defendant Kenneth J. 
l)inney on Decen1ber :2:1~ 1~l88 and in the late afternoon 
pa~~Pd the point on Highland Drive \Vhere the appellant 
"·a~ injured, and \Ya~ parked at the Dixie lunch stand in 
~ugar Hou~e \\·hen appellant delivered to hiin the \\·heel. 
(Transcript 217 -22-l-, .L.\bstraet 82-:1;)). The defendant 
X e~len testified that there \\·as a \\·hePl Ini~sing fron1 the 
hand-truck and that the \vheel the plaintiff handed hi1n 
looked like one of the "·heels off his hand-truck and he \Vas 
surprised to find plaintiff had it. ( Transeript 238, Ab-
~traet :~3). The \\·itness Butter\vorth testified that he \vas 
delivering mail to the Dixie Lunch -vvhen the appellant 
\vith -vvhom he \vas acquainted arrived there -vvith the \vheel 
in his hand and that the hand-truck \\'"ith a -vvheel1nissing 
from it \Vas hanging on the side of the truck just behind 
the <lriYer 's cab. (Transcript 151-154, Abstract 19-21). 
lTpon examing the hand-truck produced in court h~v the 
defendants, the -vvitness Butterworth testified that the 
w·heels on it -vvere different fron1 the wheel \vhich \Vas on 
the hand-truck on the da~· of the injury and the \vheel 
\'{hich struek appellant. The \vheel which struck appel-
lant \\'a::-: larg(~r. the axle \Vas larger, the tire covering on 
the \\·heel \vhieh struck appellant \vas \vorn and the iron 
~how'erl through in a fe\v spots. (Transcript 200, 201, 
.. \h~trart 29). The appellant testified that the \vheels on 
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6 
the hand-truck produced in court were different from the 
wheel which had struck him and he pointed qut the same 
differences as did the witness Butterworth, together with 
the additional difference that there was a different 
method of greasing the two whe~ls. (Transcript 207, Ab-
stract 31). 
II. SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR 
Appellant on this appeal has made 11 assignments of 
error which may be summarized as follows: 
1. The trial court should have instructed the jury 
that the defendants were guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law. (Assignments of Error 1, 4, 7, 8, and 9. Abs. 
66, 67). 
2. The trial court should not have submitted the 
issue of contributory negligence to the jury. (Assign-
ments of Error 2, 5, 6, 9, and 11. Abs. 66-68). 
3. The instructions given by the trial court on con-
tributory negligence were not confined to the contribu-
tory negligence alleged in defendants' answer, and having 
submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury 
the trial court should have given appellant's requested 
instruction No.4. (Assigninents of Error 3, 6, 9, and 11. 
Abs. 66-68). 
4. The court usurped the prerogative of the jury in 
assun1ing as true evidence about which there vvas a sub-
stantial dispute. ( Assignn1ent of Error 10. Abs. 68). 
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III. BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
The doctrine of res ipsa kJqfiJJitur applied :to the -ease 
and the appellant ~vas entitled to a peremptory instruc-
tion that the defendants 'lvere negligent as a matter of 
law. 
PoiNT 2. 
There be-ing no eridence .supporting the defense of 
contributory negligenc'e, .that ,is~c~te should 111ot hrav~e been 
sub1nitted to the jury. 
PorNT.3. 
The trial cottrt erred ·in YJ'I!.Ot limiting its instructions 
on contributory negligence to that contributory negligence 
:which uJas alleged in -bhe ·answer. 
PDINT 4. 
;Havmg submitte-d cthe issue ~nf 'Contributory negli-
·g~en;c·e -tv the ju·ry the ~court should ,·h.av:e g~iven .appellant's 
cre.quested ·instruction No. 4, ~:to ~the ;.effect :-that ·appel-
lant .•being shield.ed by ··his -truck ~parked pa·rallel ~to 
·the curb ~was under >no· dtttJy to maintain a ·constant. look-
out and his fail~t're. to 1naintain a -:lookrout under ·those 
circu,rnstanc-es may ·ndt ·be considered as ·contributory 
negligence. 
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PoiNT 5. 
That the defendants would not be liable if the defect 
in their equipment was simply unknown to them was a 
mis-stateme~t of the law. 
PoiNT 6. 
The trial court usurped the prerogative of the jury 
in assuming as true evidence about which there was a sub-
stantial dispute. 
PoiNT 7. 
That the trial court should have granted appellant's 
motion for a new trial. 
I\T. ARGU~1:ENT 
POINT 1. 
The doctri,ne of res ipsa loquitur applied to the case 
and the appellant tvas entitled to a peremptory instruction 
that the defendants were negligent as a nzatter of law. 
There is a decided split in the authorities as to whether 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur raises a presumption of 
negligence or merely authorizes the jury to find negligence 
from the fact of the occurrence. The Supren1e Court of 
Utah has committed itself to the view that \vhen a thing 
-vvhich causes injury is shown to be under the exclusive 
control of the defendant, and the injury i~ such as, in thP 
ordinary course of things, dot~:-; not oernr if the one haY-
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ing such control uses proper care, it affords reasonable 
evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that the injury 
aro~e fro1n the defendant's \Yant of care. That view is 
expressed in ,,~illian1son v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry. Co., 52 
lTtah 8-±, 17:2 Pac. 680, and Zoccolillo v. Oregon Short Line 
R .. Co .. ji1 lTtah 39. 177 Pac. 201. In the latter case, the 
Court said. ho\vever. at page 63-64: 
.. It (negligence) 1nay be inferred fron1 such 
occurrence, and ''"here no explanation is offered 
in such case the inference 1nny he so strong as not 
only to justify. but to e(nnpel, a i1nding of negli-
gence. \Yhich is the ultin1ate fact to he established.', 
,,,.. e believe that the ca~e of Furkovich v. Binghan1 
Coal & Lun1ber Co., -1-:5 Utah 89, 14::3 Pac. 121, supports 
the principle for \\-hieh \\-e are here contending. In that 
ease the plaintiff \Yas struck by large piece of eoal \Yhich 
rolled do\vn the n1ountainside. The plaintiff's cornpanion 
\Vent up the trail to the top of the n1ountatin \\"here tlH_; 
coal \\Tas heing unloaded and found a n1an unloading conl 
out of a vvagon and a pile of coal \vas located on the 
1nountainside \vithin a couple of feet fron1 the brink of 
the steep incline of the 1nountain. In that case the trial 
court had instructed the jury as follows : 
''Yon are instructed that if you should find 
fron1 a preponderance of the evidence that the 
piece of coal vvhich rolled do\vn the mountain side 
and struck the plaintiff vvas a part of the coal being 
unloaded by the defendant at the tin1e and place 
alleged in plaintiff's co1nplaint, the rolling of such 
piece of coal do,vn the steep rnoun ta tin side raises 
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10 
a presumption of negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, and unless you should find from all the 
evidence in the case that such presumption is over-
come, you should find for the plaintiff.'' 
The foregoing insruction was duly excepted to, but 
the Supreme Court upheld the instruction saying: 
''If what we have said respecting the infer-
ence or presumption of negligence is correct, then 
it follows that the court did not err in giving the 
charge excepted to.'' 
The record in the case at bar is entirely bereft of any 
explanation whatever as to how the wheel flew from the 
hand-truck and struck the plaintiff. The defendant 
Neslen testified on cross-examination that he had never 
taken out the cotter key nor had he made any other inspec-
tion of the hand-truck, except greasing it, although the 
hand-truck had been used over a year (Transcript 240, 
Abstract 35, 36). 
1 Shearrnan & Redfield on Negligence, Gth Ed., 130 : 
''Whether it (res ipsa loquitur) "rill warrant a 
peremptory instruction is to be determined as in 
other cases by the ans,ver to the question, is there 
any other reasonable view of the case~'' 
That the circumstances may warrant a perernptory 
instruction is indicated by the foregoing quotation. The 
case of Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurlst. & C. 722, 159 Eng. 
Reports 299 applies the rule applicable to the case at bar. 
In that case plaintiff was 'valking in a public street past 
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the defendant•s shop "\vhen a barrel of flour fell upon him 
from a "\vindovv above the shop: 
"''re are all of opinion that the rule n1ust be 
absolute to enter the verdict for the plaintiff. The 
learned counsel \vas quite right in saying that 
there are n1any accidents from which no presump-
tion of negligence can arise, but I think it would be 
vvrong to la~~ dow'n as a rule that in no case can a 
pre~tunption of negligence arise froin the fact of 
the accident. Suppose in this case the barrel harl 
rolled out of the "\Varehouse and fallen on the plain-
tiff. Ho,veyer could he possibl:v assert from what 
cause it occurred J? It is the duty of persons vvho 
keep barrels in a \Yarehouse to take care that they 
do not roll out. and I think that such a case vvould, 
heyonrl all doubt, afford prima facie evidence of 
negligence. __._-\ barrel could not roll out of a vvare-
house \Yithout some negligence, and to say· that a 
plaintiff who is injured by it must call vvitness(~S 
from the \Yarehouse to prove negligence seerlls to 
n1e preposterous. So in the building or repairing 
of a house, or putting pots on the chin1neys, if a 
person passing along the road is injured hy S(Hl1e-
thing falling upon him, I think the accident alone 
\Vould he prin1a facie evidence of negligence. Or 
if an article calculated to cause darnage is put in a 
'vrong place and does mischief, I think that those 
vvhose duty it was to put it in the right place are 
prima facie responsible, and if there is any state of 
facts to rebut the presumption of negligence, they 
must prove the1n. '' 
To the same effect is the case of Cincinnati Traction 
Co. v. _1\.nna Holzenkamp, 7-1- Ohio St. 379, 78 N. E. 529. 
The plaintiff \vas struck by the falling of a trolley pole 
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12 
from an electric car. The Supreme Court of Ohio held 
that the trial court "was warranted in taking judicial 
notice of the fact, as it did, that such a thing as the break-
ing of the trolley pole and the falling of the trolley with 
a portion of the pole does not happen in the ordinary 
course of events, unless there was some negligence either 
in its construction or in the management of it; and, this 
being so the court very properly charged the jury that 
the plaintiff in the absence of any evidence tending to 
rebut the presumption of negligence, was entitled to re-
cover for her injuries.'' 
The following cases follow the same principle: 
Hogan v. Manhattan Ry. Co., Court of Appeals of 
New York, 43 N. E. 403; 
Heidt v. People's Motorbus Co. of St. Louis 
(Mo.), 9 S. W. 2d 650; 
Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, Inc., et al. (Ia.) 228 
N. W. 320; 
1f.umma v. Easton & A. R. Co. et al. (New Jersey) 
65 Atl. 208; 
Francisco v. Circle Tours Sight-Seeing Co. (Ore.), 
265 Pac. 801 ; 
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Rowland (Ky.), 214 
S. W. 910; 
State v. Emerson & Morgan Coal Co. (~Td.), 133 
Atl. 601; 
Gates v. Crane Co. (Conn.), 139 Atl. 782; 
Feeney v. New York Waist House (Conn.), 136 
Atl. 554. 
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PoiNT 2. 
There being no evidence supporting the defense of 
contribu,fory negligence, that issue should not have been 
sub1nitted to the jury. 
The record discloses the follo,ving undisputed facts: 
.... \.t the tin1e of the injury the appellant was shielded be-
hind his CheYrolet ·panel truck in the act of handing 
flo\vers to the \Yitness )[ax\vell. ~faxwell was standing 
between hin1 and the balance of the street. The truck 
\Yas parked parallel to and vvithin a fevv inches of the 
curb on the \Yest side of the street. Cars proceeding in 
a northerly direction \vould have to get over on the wrong 
~ide of the street in order to present the danger of in-
jury to hin1, and that "Tas the direction in which the 
truck driven by the defendant Neslen was traveling. Fur-
thermore, from the testimony of the witness l\rfaxwell, 
who said that the "wheel buzzed past me," it would be 
reasonable to conclude that if the appellant could have 
~een the \vheel before it struck hi1n, he \vould not have 
been able to dodge it. It could not be reasonably con-
tended that the appellant could have anticipated that 
the \Vheel would fly off the hand-truck, as he never had 
an opportunity or a duty to inspect the hand-truck. 
It is universally held that although the question of 
contributory negligence is generally for the jury, if the 
evidence is undisputed and there is no fact showing con-
tributory negligence or from \vhich such negligence can 
be reasonably inferred, then it is the positive duty of the 
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court to eliminate that issue fro1n the consideration of 
the jury. Some tangible evidence must be introduced be-
fore the question can be left to the jury; the burden of 
proving the defense cannot be sustained by silence. The 
very purpose of instructions is to enable the jury to 
better understand their duty and to prevent them from 
arriving at erroneous and false conclusions. In sub-
mitting an issue to the jury upon which there is 
no evidence, that purpose is thwarted. 
This point has been passed upon by this Court many 
times. We submit that the case of Atwood v. Utah Light 
& Ry. Co., 44 Utah 366, 140 Pac. 137, is directly in point. 
In holding the plaintiff free from contributory negligence 
as a matter of law, the Court said: 
"The facts here are not disputed, at least not 
with regard to respondent's conduct. Now what 
was there in her conduct from which a jury or 
anybody else would· be justified to find that any-
thing she did or ·omitted to do was the proxi1nate 
~ause of or directly contributed to, the accident 
and consequent injury~ ... \V e can see no reason· 
whatever why, under the undisputed evidence, re-
spondent's conduct should likewise have been sub-
mitted to the jury ... As a n1atter of course, in 
cases like the one at bar, the trial courts should 
ordinarily submit the question of negligence to 
the jury; and such should be done in all cases when 
there is any substantial evidence upon \¥hich a 
finding of negligence can be based. \\ThPre, ho\¥-
ever, as here, there is no evidence, the question 
must be deter1nined as ·one of lavv and not of 
fact." 
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In the foregoing case the trial court had charged the 
jury as follo,vs: '~You are instructed that there is no 
evidence in this case of any negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff.'' It 'vas held by this Court that no error 
\Yas co1n1nitted by the court in so charging the jury. 
To the san1e effect is the case of Maybee v. ~[aybee, 
79 l:tah 383, 11 Pac. 2d 973; Parks v. Tillis (\\T. \Tn \, 1 G/~_ 
S. E. 7~17. 
Confir1ning our position is the case of l\Ienafee v. 
Jionongahela Ry. Co. (\\T. \Ta.), 148 S. E. 109. In that 
case plaintiff 'vas injured by a lump of coal which fell 
from a 1noving train "\vhen the driving brakes were 
applied jarrnning the train. Quoting fron1 the opinion: 
"\\ ... e conclude fron1 the 'vhole record that 
there vvas no occasion to submit to the jury the 
question of contributory negligence, because there 
was no appreciable basis on which to predicate 
such charge. The record does not disclose any 
act of omission or commission on the plaintiff '8 
part 'vhich contributed to his injur:'. In such 
situation the defense of contributory negligence 
is a question of law for the· court and not of fact 
for the jury (citing cases). Such being the law, 
the fact that contributory negligence was n1en-
tioned in instructions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 given for 
plaintiff and omitted in others has no weight. If 
contributory negligence was not an issue, the 
negativing thereof in some of the plaintiff's in-
~tructions did not make it an issue; it was rnere 
~urplusage. It follo,vs that the failure to nega-
tive that defense in instructions Nos. 4, 7, and 8 
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was not improper. For the same reason defenjl-
ant 's instructions Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 
19, 20, 21 and 22 were properly refused." 
In appellant's requested instruction No. 2, the trial 
court was asked to instruct the jury that under the evi-
<ience the appellant was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence 1n any way. (Transcript 24, Abstract 40). The 
question of contributory negligence was submitted to the 
jury in the following instructions: Nos. 7, 8, 10, and 13. 
(Transcript 58, 59, 61, 64, Abstract 45-49). The record is 
entirely nude of any fact which shows that appellant in 
lawfully standing in the street was guilty of a breach 
of duty, and there can be no negligence unless some duty 
has been viola ted. 
In view of the evidence and of the foregoing authori-
ties, appellant respectfully contends that the trial court 
committeed prejudicial error in submitting the unproved 
issue of contributory negligence to the jury. 
PorNT 3. 
The trial court erred in not limiting its instructions 
on contributory negligence to that contributory negli-
gence U'hich was alleged in the answer~ 
Appellant contends not only that the defense of 
contributory negligence was not proved, but certain of 
the trial court's instructions directed the jury to pass 
upon elen1ents of contributory negligence whirh \V"ere not 
pleaded by the defendants in their ansvver. 
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In their ans\Yer the defendants alleged that the plain-
tiff acted in a ''negligent, careless, in1prudent and illegal 
1nanner in this: that at said time and place the plaintiff 
failed to obserYe any lookout for vehicles passing the 
point "'"here he \Yas standing and took no precautions 
\YhatsoYer to protect himself against being injured in 
any n1anner by said Yehicles so passing \vhile the plain-
tiff \Yas then and there standing in the traveled portion 
of the said high"yay." (Transcript 14, Abstract 11, 12) . 
..L-\fter stating so1ne abstract propositions, the trial 
court, in its instruction No. 7, directed the jury as fol-
lo\YS: 
''If, therefore, you find fron1 the evidence in 
this case that the plaintiff himself failed to use 
ordinary care for his ovvn safety at the ti1ne and 
plaee complained of and that such failure proxi-
mately contributed to the accident and his result-
ing injuries, then your verdict must be in favor 
of the defendants, no cause of action.'' 
(Transcript 275, Abstract 45, 46). 
A cursory reading of the instruction will serve to 
demonstrate its generality. It made no mention of the 
failure to maintain a look-out or failure to take precau-
tions against being injured by passing vehicles, but 
authorized the jury to find any type of negligence. 
Instruction No. 10 (Transcript 276, 277, Abstract 47) 
i~ even n1ore objectionable: 
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''The jury is instructed that if it believes 
from the evidence that both the plaintiff and the 
defendant were guilty of negligence, and that the 
negligence of each directly contributed to the in-
jury of the plaintiff, there can be no recovery rn 
this case, and your verdict will be for the de-
fendants.'' 
The instruction did not clarify the. issue of contribu-
tory negligence for the jury; it merely contained a propo-
sition of law; and the jury must perforce have interpreted 
the instruction to 1nean that if the plaintiff was guilty 
of negligence of any kind or character, pleaded or un-
pleaded, and if his negligence contributed to the injury 
which he sustained, then the jury Blust find against him. 
Instruction No. 13 (Transcript 187, 188, Abstract 48, 
49) makes the follo\ving reference to contributory negli-
gence: 
'' ... and, if you further find plaintiff was not 
negligent in being -w-here he \vas and doing \vhat 
he \Vas doing, or such negligence of plaintiff, if 
any, did not proximately contribute to his in-
. . ' ' JUries ... 
The only contributory negligence pleaded consisted 
of acts of omission-failure to 1naintain look-out and to 
take precautions for safety. The instruction authorized 
a finding of negligence acts of comn1ission, and the jury 
were instructed to disallow recovery if such negligence 
was found. 
Appellant relies upon the case of I~oehhead v. Jensen, 
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42 lTtah 99, 129 Pac. ~l±7, as authority for the proposition 
contended for under this point. Quoting from the 
opinion: 
~ · Xo\Y as to the charge. Notwithstanding the 
single act of alleged negligence-running the auto-
lnobile at a high rate of speed-the court never-
theless rharged that if the jury found that the de-
fendant · \Ya~ driYing ~aid car negligently or care-
lessly, or if you belieYe that he was driving at a 
rec kles~ or dangerous rate of speed' and that 'the 
death resulted directl~· and proximatel:v· fron1 such 
negligence or carelessness, then you should find 
for the plaintiffs.· ..:\gain, the court eharged that 
if the jury found that 'the defendant -vvas not in 
the exereise of reasonable care in the operation 
of his said car, and that by reason thereof the 
jnjury occurred to the said deceased, and the said 
negligence of the said defendant \Vas the direct 
and proximate cause of the said injury, 'then the 
defendant \Vas liable.' The court also charged 
that it \\Tas the duty of the defendant in operating 
the automobile 'to use due diligence in the driving 
of the same so as to have it under reasonable 
control at all times to avoid injury; and it is th~ 
duty of the driver of said car to keep a reasonable 
look-out for an~T obstructions or dangers that 1na.\· 
be in the road upon \vhich he is driving, and if he 
fails to do so and through his negligence causes 
injury to others, then he is liable therefor.' The 
court further charged that in determining \vhether 
or not defendant '\vas exercising reasonable care' 
the jur.\· might consider 'the matter in \vhich the 
defendant \\Tas driving' and 'the speed at \vhich he 
\vas fb·iving.' It is thus seen that the charge 
clearly presented to the jury questions of negli-
gence far beyond that charged in the co1nplaint 
and per1nitted thP jury to has~ a Y~rdirt, not onl~T 
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upon the negligence alleged but also upon any 
negligent or careless operation, management, 
control, or driving of the auto1nobile, or failure to 
observe or keep a reasonable lookout for obstruc-
tions or dangers in the road. That the charge, in 
view of the alleged negligence, was erroneous and 
prejudicial needs no argument.'' 
PoiNT 4. 
Hat;ing subntitted the isstte of contributory negli-
gence to the jury the court should have given appellant's 
requested instruction No. 4, to the effect that app-ella1tt 
being shielded by his truck parked parallel to the curb 
was under no dtlty to 1naintain a constant look-out and his 
failure to n1 aintain a look-out under those circumstances 
112ay not be considered as contributory negligence. 
(Transcript 26, .. A .. bstract 40). 
~t\.lthough by urging this point we do not concede 
that the court \Vas warranted in submitting the issue of 
contributor~;' negligence to the jury, yet, having done so, 
it is contended that the trial court erred in failing anil rP-
fusing to give appellant's requested instruction No. 4; 
and in substantiation of this contention, appellant re-
spectfully calls the court's attention to the case of 
Fabricus v. \Tieira (Calif.), 233 Pac. 396. In that case 
plaintiff parked his car facing north off the paved por-
tion of the highvvay. The left side of the car was between 
18 inches and 4 feet fron1 the paved portion. Plaintiff 
\vas standing on the left side of the car in the act of fixing 
the carburetor \vhen he "Tas strur k by a truck being 
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driven in the same direction that plaintiff's car was fac-
ing. It "\Vas contended that the plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence. Quoting from the decision: 
"It appears that there was nothing to have 
prevented plaintiff from parking his automobile 
at a greater distance from the pavement, and that 
he made no effort to observe approaching vehicles 
\Yhile he was adjusting the carburetor. Had he 
attempted to watch for approaching machines, he 
probably could have done little else, because the 
evidence \vas there were many automobiles travel-
ing along the pavement in either direction .... 
''There is no doubt as to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sho'v that the driver of the truck -vvas 
guilty of actionable negligence which vvas the 
proximate cause of the injury. It is equally clear 
that the evidence does not show, as a matter of 
la,v, that the plaintiff vvas guilty of contributory 
negligence. These conclusions so clearly appear 
from a mere statement of the evidence that fur-
ther discussion is deemed unnecessary.'' 
Bearing in mind the fact that the truck behind vvhich 
the appellant was standing, in the case at bar, vvas a 
panel truck so that it \Vould be impossible for appellant 
to see over the top of it to observe the defendants' truck 
which came from the opposite direction, and bearing in 
mind that the appellant, if he saw the truck approaching, 
vvould not be able to anticipate that a wheel -vvould be 
thrown at him as it sped by, it is difficult to conceive, 
without doing violence to reason and common sense, why 
the appellant "\Vould be required to maintain a look-out. 
It \\rould be in1possible for anyone to open the back-doors 
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ot a panel truck tb get something out of it to effect a 
delivery, if during all the time he was required to in some 
m'anner watch for ahd dodge missiles which might be 
thrown at him from passing vehicles. 
PoiNT 5. 
That the defe>ndants u'ould not be liable if the defect 
~-
in their equi;pin/ent tvas simply unknown to them was a 
mis-statement of the law. 
Appellant's 'objections in this r-e·gard are ba:sed prin-
cipally upon the trial court's ins.truction No. 13 (Trans-
cript 187, 188, Abstract 48, 49). 
'' ... you n1ust return a ver·dict in favor of 
plaintiff, u~nless you believe that the defect in 
defendants' ·equipment, if you find the ·ivheel was 
thrown against plaintiff 'because of a defect in the 
equipment, was unkno\vn to defendants, or could 
not have been discovered by them upon a reason-
able .prudent jnspe'etion, 'in which event, 1if you 
helieve either of -these t'\vo ·alternatives you· should 
find in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action.'' 
By the instruction two· alternatives \vere ·presented 
to 't-he jury and "'they should deny recovery if either .Of 
the two alternatives~was found. In·other words the·clear 
import of the instruction is: if the defe·ct in ·the ·eqnip-
ln-ent was unknown to ·the defendants, then ~the jury 
should find in favor of the defendants, no eause of action: 
or, if the defect could not ihav-e hPPn discovered :by the 
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defendants through a reasonable, prudent inspection, 
then they \Yere not liable. ''T e respectfully contend that 
the rule \Yas i1nproperly stated in the disjunctive in the 
forepart of Instruction 13 and the disjunctive vvas ein-
phasized by the court stating the proposition in the 
alternatiYe in the latter part of Instruction 13. This vvas 
a perpetuation of the Inisleading, disjunctive statement 
of the san1e proposition in Instruction 12 (Transcript 
186, 187, ~\bstract -±7 ~ -!8). 
~-\_ppellant neYer contended at any ti1ne that the de-
feet in defendants· equipment \Yas kno\vn to the1n, nor 
did appellant atten1pt to prove that the defect vvas kno\vn 
to the defendants. In fact the testi1nony of both the 
plaintiff and the defendant N eslen was to the effect that 
the defendant X eslen \Yas surprised to discover that the 
wheel \Yas not on the hand-truck. And yet, the jury were 
instructed that if the defect was unknown to the defend-
ants, then they must find in their favor, no cause of 
action. Remen1bering that it is the jury's svvorn duty to 
follo\v the directions of the trial court, it is difficult to 
perceive how it would be possible for the jury under 
Instructions 12 and 13 to find for the plaintiff; and the 
instructions were tanta1nount to a peremptory charge 
that the defendants were not negligent at all. 
It is submitted that the rule correctly stated is as 
follow's: Although the defect in the equipment is unknovvn 
to the defendants, they are nevertheless liable for injuries 
eaused by such defect if a reasonable, prudent inspection 
\Vould haYe diselosed it. 
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Ntunerous illustrations of this proposition are a£-· 
forded by the cases. In the derailment of a railroad 
train, those operating the train are not absolved fron1 
liability simply because they did not kno-vv of the defect 
in the track or in the equipruent, vvhich a rea~onable, pru-
dent inspection would have disclosed. Jn the case of Kean 
v. Srnith-Reis Piano Co. (:l\fo.), 227 H. W. 1091, the de-
fendant maintained a flagpole over the sidewalk which 
fell upon plaintiff. It could not have been contended that 
the defendant could absolve itself from liability simply 
because it may not have kno\vn that there was a defect in 
the pole. 
Indeed, appellant has not been able to find a case 
in which the rule applied in Instructions 12 and 13 has 
been approved. 
PoiNT 6. 
The trial court usurped the prerogatire of the ,jttry 
in assuming as true eridence abottt U)hich there was a 
·"·nbsta n t ia l disp1de. 
In its Instruction No. 16 (Transcript 280, Abstract 
50, ;)1) the trial court told the jtu·:· that the:· had b(1 Pn 
pern1itted to view' the motor truck and the ha1Hl-truek 
and dolly. 
Reference is here 1nade to the State1nent of the Case 
g·iven earlie1· in this brief \Yhere it is sh0\\'11 that therr 
\Yas a substantial dispute in th(l PYi<len('P as to th<' identjty 
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of the \Yheel "Thich struck appellant and the "\vheels which 
\Yere on the hand-truck \Yhich the jury had been permitted 
to vie\Y and \Yhich \Yas produced in court by the defend-
ant~. 
~-\ppellant contends that the "\Vording of Instruction 
X o. 16 disregards this dispute in the evidence and con-
stituted an interference \\yith the jur~T 's fact-finding pre-
rogative. The jur)T n1ay have construed the instruction 
as a discrediting by the court of appellant's testin1ony 
and the testilnony of the \Yitness Butter\vorth, and \vas, 
therefore, mo~t prejudicial. 
The jury sy~ten1 is founded upon the funda1nental 
principle that the n1embers of the jury are the exclusive 
judges of a disputed fact and the jury system would fail 
if the court \Yere allowed to interfere with its fact-finding 
prerogative by giving a judicial view of the evidence. 
The Court's attention is called to the case of Sullivan 
v. ~filler (Ala.), 140 So. 606; 
''(~barge 8 \vas also bad and should not ha vr 
been given. It assumes that Cook carried the 
pistol on the premises of the plaintiff in the effort 
to take the property, under the mortgage. While 
this may have been the purpose of Cook and it 
"\Vas open to the jury to so find under the evidence, 
yet the charge assumes it to be a fact, and, for 
assuming to be true a disputed fact was faulty.'' 
See also Lorie v. Lumbermen's l\futual Casualty Co. 
(1fo.), 8 S. W. 2d 81. 
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The Utah Suprerne Court has passed upon this point 
in the case of Nelson v. Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17 Pac. 2cl 272. 
In that case the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
"The court instructs the jury that the plaintiff, Nelson, 
was, at the time of the injury in this case, in a place where 
he had a right to be, etc.'' This Court in condemning the 
instruction said: 
''One of the 1nost strenuously contested 
points in the case \vas whether or not respondent 
was standing in the position he claims to have 
been in when the collision occurred, or stepped 
suddenly into the position where he \vas injured at 
the n1oment of the in1pact. Neither of the parties 
were trespassers. They \Vere invitees and they 
had an equal right to be on the pre1nises. But to 
which of them had the right, or the prior or 
superior right to be in the particular spot \vhere 
the injury occurred at the ti1ne of its occurrence, 
\Ve think, in vie\v of the conflict in the evid~ .. nee, 
\vas a question ''Thich the jury should havP been 
privileged to detern1ine. We think the in~truetion 
was probably calculated to rnislead the jury, P~­
pecially when considPr(•rl in conjunction \\·ith in-
struction No. 8.'' 
That the trial court shou.ld hare granted appellant's 
1notion for a ne1c t1·ial. 
By reason of the prejudicial error~ rounnittecl by tlH· 
trial court as hereinabove discussed, \vhich prevente(l 
appellant fron1 having a fair trial, it is suh1nitted that 
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the District Court should haYe granted a.ppellant 's nlo-
tion for a ne"~ trial. 
CO~CLUSIONS 
In eoneluding this brief, appellant submits that for 
the reasons herein outlined the trial court erred to the 
prejudice of the appellant in its instructions to the jury 
and in its failure and refusal to give the instructions 
\Yhich appellant seasonably requested. 
It is further respectfully submitted by appellant 
that the trial court, in view of the errors herein assigned 
and herein discussed, should have granted appellant's 
motion for a new trial; and that the sound and long 
established principles of law and justice require that 
the judgment of the District Court be reversed and 
appellant be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODROW D. WHITE, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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